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TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND SOUTH AFRICA
Sasha Vanja Franicevic∗
Summary: The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, often 
used as a shield of protection against foreign markets, has led to huge 
trade distortions in developing countries. Due to international pres-
sure, the global trading giant has had to reform its internal policy 
measures to ensure a level playing field for all parties concerned. 
However, huge disparities still exist. South Africa, the African conti-
nent’s largest economy, recently entered into a trade agreement with 
the European Union. The aim was to establish a free trade area over 
a 12-year period. The South African trade sector, largely unsupported 
by its government due to inadequate financial resources and policy in-
frastructure, now stands to compete with the European trading giant; 
a trading giant whose internal protectionist measures are the key to 
its internal market’s survival and global superpower status.
1. Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years, the South African economy has undergone 
enormous economic, political, and social change.1 The economy has been 
transformed by a series of policy reforms aimed at creating a more market-
orientated economy.2 As part of the restructuring process, the South Afri-
can government has focused its macroeconomic policy on stabilising the 
country’s economic environment by attaching particular importance to fo-
reign investment, acknowledging the important role such investment plays 
in reintegrating South African society into the international community.3 
The South African government has therefore worked hard at deve-
loping its strategic alliances with global superpowers. It has continually 
sought ways in which to open up its markets to foreign investors, incre-
asing its connections with the developing world. However, opening up 
its trade borders has often come at a price, a price the developing coun-
try has been willing to pay in order to gain access to one of the world’s 
biggest and most prestigious markets: the European Union. 
∗  Recent graduate in Master of European Studies at the University of Zagreb, Croatia
1 OECD, ‘OECD Review of Agricultural Policies - South Africa’ (OECD, 2006) <http://
www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3343,en_2649_33797_36482847_1_1_1_1,00.html> acce-
ssed 2 May 2011.
2 OECD (n 1).
3 OECD (n 1).
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With the EU constantly seeking to develop untapped markets, South 
Africa is the perfect playground for the EU to invest in. A country with an 
abundance of natural resources and low production costs, South Africa 
has become the EU’s 14th largest trading partner.4
However, gaining reciprocal trade benefits from the global trading 
giant can be challenging. The EU follows a strict internal trade policy, 
ensuring above all the protection of its own internal market. Its protec-
tionist stance towards its local markets is most visible in its agricultural 
sector. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has ensured the pro-
tection of EU producers, leaving little room for external influences that 
have the potential to disrupt its internal market. Due to a heavily subsi-
dised market, European farmers have been able to enjoy limited export 
subsidies when entering foreign markets.5 By securing aid packages, and 
investing in EU production, CAP has ensured optimal value for its own 
producers, often to the detriment to those in the developing world.
With the EU using its superpower status to encourage less developed 
states such as South Africa to open up their markets, it has increased the 
market availability of often limited natural resources. In order for the EU 
to sustain its global trade supremacy, it needs to constantly explore ways 
in which to develop its internal market, and the key to this, it believes, 
is through untapped markets. The following paper seeks to explore the 
trade backgrounds of two diverse trading partners and how their internal 
trade policies are beginning to define their external trade relations.
2. The EU as a key player in the global market
The EU powerhouse of 27 Member States share a single market, a 
single external border, and a single trade policy.6 By working together as 
a solidified union, the EU has become the world’s largest trading block. 
With a population of 495 million, the EU accounts for 20% of global trade.7
It is considered the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods, 
designer goods, and high-value goods.8 The EU has become the single 
biggest market for imports from developing countries, exporting twice 
4 G Gambini, ‘External Trade’ (Eurostat: Statistics in Focus, 2010) 1 <http://www.eds-
destatis.de/de/downloads/sif/sf_10_042.pdf> accessed 12 May 2011.
5 P Goodison, ‘EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Tools Protecting European Far-
mers’ (South Centre, 2011) 3 <http://www.southcentre.org> accessed 13 May 2011.
6 Directorate-General for Trade, ‘Europe’s Trade Policy’ (Europa, 2009) <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/may/tradoc_143154.pdf> accessed 10 January 2011.
7 European Commission, ‘Living in the EU’ (Europa, 2011) <http://europa.eu/about-eu/
facts-figures/living/index_en.htm> accessed 7 June 2011.
8 European Commission, ‘Wise Choices?’ (Europa Diary, 2009/2010) <http://www.
ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/cons_education_en.htm#diary> accessed 10 Ja-
nuary 2011.
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the amount in return.9 It is also the biggest investor in underdeveloped 
countries, contributing nearly 50% towards global aid.10 By continually 
investing in new markets, the EU is regarded as being a forerunner in 
trade liberalisation and development. As an exporting economy, the EU 
relies upon open markets, benefiting substantially from market liberali-
sation in developing states.
2.1 EU trade policy
Between 2000 and 2007, the average value of extra-EU-27 exports 
was EUR 1.241 billion, whilst the value of imports averaged nearly EUR 
1.434 billion.11 The EU is characterised by a permanent but generally 
limited trade deficit, reaching nearly USD 31.793 million.12 This limited 
trade deficit has enabled the EU to gain a huge amount of influence in 
the international trade sector. The EU’s trade policy is based on maxi-
mising internal development. In order to sustain its internal market, it 
constantly seeks out new trading opportunities that could increase in-
vestment opportunities and growth for the European community. It the-
refore follows a multilateral liberalisation approach to its external trade 
policies, and a regional integration approach regarding its internal trade 
policy.
A firm believer in multilateral trade liberalisation, the EU uses trade 
as a tool for development in order to boost economic growth and increa-
se job prosperity within the Union.13 The EU also holds that in order to 
increase European prosperity within the Union, it needs to expand its 
trade market, and that the key to this is developing untapped markets.
The core philosophy governing the EU internal market is the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour, and undistorted compe-
tition and non-discrimination. As the overall prosperity of the EU is de-
pendent on market-driven economic success, it has worked hard at deve-
loping its expansion policies, as well as developing supportive structures 
and mechanisms on which Member States can rely.14
The EU prides itself on its single market. It has, and continues to 
develop, measures that guarantee compliancy standards are met in all 
areas, thereby ensuring the four freedoms are adhered to throughout 
9 S Meunier, Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiation 
(Princeton UP 2005) 3.
10 Meunier (n 9).
11 Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Trade Experience beyond Africa’ (Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade, May 2010) 469 <http://www.une-
ca.org/aria4/chap13.pdf> accessed 16 January 2011.
12 Economic Commission for Africa (n 11).
13 Directorate-General for Trade (n 6) 6.
14 Directorate-General for Trade (n 6) 6.
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the Union. Internally, it has removed internal border obstacles to trade, 
including the elimination of all exchange controls.15 This internal cross-
border trading solidarity has ensured market success, giving the EU a 
vast amount of trading power within the international community.
2.2 The EU’s role in international markets: the WTO
The fact that the EU is made up of the superpowers of Europe has 
enabled it to hold a dominant position within the international trading 
system and, more importantly, the WTO. From GATT through to the esta-
blishment of the WTO, the European Union has played a pivotal role in 
influencing international trade through numerous trade agreements.
As one of the founding members of the WTO, the EU has left signi-
ficant footprints on the institutional design of the organisation.16 This 
has afforded it the ability to maintain a powerful stronghold on the deve-
lopment of the WTO and its trading developments. The EU has actively 
used its influence in the WTO to encourage the development of new mar-
kets, whilst breaking down barriers with existing trading partners.
Its stronghold within the international arena has allowed it to affect 
the outcome of trade disputes and settlements, influencing the way in 
which world trade is conducted. The fact that the EU has the ability to 
initiate and change international trade policies, as opposed to simply 
reacting to them, affords it a rather large amount of leverage within the 
global economy.17 
3. EU protectionism in agriculture
‘Free trade’ is a term frequently used but practised very little. To the 
EU, free trade is what drives its external trade policy on, prompting deve-
loping states to open their markets, encouraging them to ride on the wave 
of trading success. However, very few states have gained access to the 
dream world that the EU claims will come with an open-door trade policy, 
mainly because the EU does not actively practise what it is preaches.
The EU follows a twin approach to its trade policies. Outside its bor-
ders, it encourages an orderly global trading system, promoting trading 
alliances, adherence to WTO principles, and encouraging existing WTO 
members to invest in developing economies to increase their own mar-
ket development. However, the EU has a very different policy within its 
internal borders. It maintains a protectionist stance towards its market 
15 Directorate-General for Trade (n 6) 6.
16 KE Jorgensen, The European Union and International Organisation (Taylor & Francis 
2009) 190.
17 Meunier (n 9) 20. 
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economy, like that of a rooster over its pen, fiercely protecting various 
trade sectors, arguably its agricultural sector the most.
The rapid increase in globalisation over the last few decades has 
obviously fuelled the existing need for protectionism by states.18 Never 
before has it been so essential for countries to shield themselves from 
external trade threats. The fight over world supremacy by claiming terri-
torial domination has turned into an economic race in order to obtain 
the prize of being the biggest and brightest economic trading power.19 As 
a result of globalisation, economies and world markets have become so 
reliant on one another that it is essential that trading partners have a 
continental dimension.20 Countries now have a vested interest in develo-
ping new markets, encouraging those which lag behind to enhance their 
trading abilities, thereby increasing international dependency. The de-
mands of the international system now require a certain level of openness 
in states’ internal markets.
However, the EU is working fiercely to protect its internal market, 
albeit only as much as the international environment will allow. It is 
said to combine liberalism within its borders and a mercantilist approach 
outside.21
Even though the EU might have the financial capabilities to support 
its agricultural sectors within the Union, its agricultural level of output is 
outmatched by that of markets such as Latin America. This is purely due 
to an abundance of agricultural resources and ideal climatic conditions, 
something which money cannot buy. In order to sustain its global mar-
ket supremacy, the EU therefore needs to support its market in any way 
that it can so that it is able to compete at the international level, thereby 
ensuring that it is not excluded from the global agricultural market. In 
order to maintain its superpower status in the global sphere, it needs 
to portray itself as a self-sustaining unit, free from international market 
fluctuations that could topple its economic and political supremacy.
Its internal protectionist measures are therefore vital to its place 
in the world market. If it were to eliminate all protectionist measures, 
its internal market would be drowned by countries that are more suita-
bly adapted to producing the amount of agricultural produce needed to 
support a society.
18 B Stokes, ‘The Protectionist Myth’ (1999) 117 Foreign Policy 88, 93.
19 Stokes (n 18).
20 European Parliament, ‘The Lisbon Strategy: Objectives’ (2009) <http://circa.europa.eu/
irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/policies/lisbon/article_7207_en.htm> accessed 23 June 
2011.
21 M Wolf, ‘Cooperation or Conflict? The European Union in a Liberal Global Economy’ 
(1995) 71(2) International Affairs 325, 333.
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3.1 Agricultural support
The EU has been largely criticised for its protectionist measures towar-
ds its agricultural sector. The comparative advantage that the EU creates 
for its farmers in the Union far surpasses that of developing countries. 
The problem that mainly arises is not that the EU supports its agriculture 
and trade sector, it is that developing countries do not have the means or 
financial ability to do so, or at least not at the level at which the EU is able 
to. This therefore leaves developing countries at a complete disadvantage.
These developing countries, especially countries such as South 
Africa, do not have the financial capability to be able to compete with 
EU agricultural goods. This is not to say that their products are not of 
the same standard or are produced at a higher price: on the contrary. 
Southern Africa has one of the most sought-after agricultural climates in 
the world. Its diverse climatic regions enable a vast amount of produce 
to be harvested and developed. However, production and distribution to 
EU markets are often hindered by financial limitations and insufficient 
available resources.
The problem that develops therefore is that EU protectionist mea-
sures in its trade policies towards the South are disallowing the free flow 
of agricultural goods at a competitive price, or rather at a price which 
both parties are able to afford. For the South, the agricultural protecti-
onist measures are too strong for it to become an equal trading partner 
with the EU. Often, developing countries that enter into trade relations 
with the EU are disillusioned with the effects on trade that EU trade quo-
tas and tariff prices will have on their internal markets.
However, due to global pressure, the EU has been forced to lower its 
protectionist stance towards its external trade policy, having being criti-
cised for imposing the most costly and market-distorting of all industrial 
policies within its sector.22 Trade protection in the EU has therefore had 
to undergo serious policy reforms, with agriculture being the most deba-
ted and contentious topic during the 1986 Uruguay Trade Negotiations 
and the Doha Development Round Negotiations in 2001.23 As a result of 
the trade negotiations, the EU was forced to seek reductions in ‘all direct 
and indirect subsidies’ affecting agricultural trade.24 However, although 
a step in the right direction, these necessitated reductions and policy 
reforms that might have gone too far for weaker or less developed states.
22 Pressure was largely felt from the United States, as it threatened to impose sanctions if 
the EU failed to comply with the necessary internal reform measures. R Paarlberg, ‘Agri-
cultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?’ 
(1997) 51(3) International Organization 413, 416.
23 Paarlberg (n 22) 413.
24 Paarlberg (n 22) 413.
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3.2 Agricultural protectionism in the internal market
Extreme forms of trade protection by developed countries, especially 
in areas such as the EU, are still regarded as an anomaly by economists. 
This is mostly because the cost of protectionism, especially agricultu-
ral protectionism, often outweighs the benefits to society as a whole.25 
Economists argue that the nature of trade and market supply is vastly 
distorted, as countries are denied the ability to trade the agricultural 
products that they have a natural comparative advantage in producing.26 
Agricultural subsidies are therefore are at the expense of the consumer 
and taxpayer.27 
There is little doubt that a majority of the population in industriali-
sed countries would benefit from a reduction in agricultural support. Go-
vernment subsidisation of agricultural production leaves the consumer 
benefiting from lower prices of agricultural goods, but at the same time 
consumers are left paying high levels of taxes in order to compensate for 
the market distortion.28 However, despite the high consumer price that co-
mes with agricultural subsidisation, the EU remains firm on the need for 
agricultural support throughout the Union, highlighting the developmen-
tal advantages and structural reforms that come with government support.
The EU has therefore structured its Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in such a way that it keeps trade flows between the EU and develo-
ping countries smaller than they otherwise would be if there were no EU 
government support measures in place. Due to market distortions and 
unrepresented value in trade, developing countries are required to inte-
grate even further into global markets to ensure future economic growth 
and development within their own regions.29
The EU uses a plethora of policy instruments to protect its agricul-
tural sector, ensuring continual production for its internal as well as 
external markets.30 EU CAP subsidies amount to nearly EUR 50 billion 
a year, plus an additional 10 billion a year in co-financing from Member 
States’ national budgets.31 However CAP support is moving away from 
traditional market-management tools, such as price arrangements, pro-
25 CG Thies and S Porche, ‘The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection’ (2007) 69 The 
Journal of Politics 116, 116.
26 Thies and Porche (n 25).
27 Jong Hee Park and N Jensen, ‘Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD 
Countries’ (2007) 51(2) American Journal of Political Science, 314.
28 Park and Jensen (n 27) 315.
29 F Sinabell, ‘Developing Countries and EU Agricultural and Food Policy’ in A Oskam , G 
Meester and H Silvis (eds), EU Policy for Agriculture, Food and Rural Areas (Mansholt Publi-
cation 2010.
30 Goodison (n 5).
31 Goodison (n 5).
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duction quotas and export subsidies, towards a more direct producer 
support system.
Since its inception, CAP has undergone numerous reforms that have 
not only affected the EU’s agricultural support system, but also that of 
global agricultural markets.
3.3 CAP 2013 initiatives 
Since its establishment in 1962, the main objective of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy has been to ensure an adequate supply of food for all 
EU Member States.32 Achieving this objective was to be met by continual 
technological progress within the sector; optimum utilisation of the factors 
of production; and stabilisation of the markets, ensuring the continual ava-
ilability of supplies to consumers. Above all, CAP was to ensure a fair stan-
dard of living to all those committed to the agricultural sector.
With these goals in mind, CAP sought to develop several instruments 
in order to attain its objectives. The most important objective was to ma-
intain high producer prices through the establishment of price interven-
tion or a minimum growth price system.33 Price intervention allowed na-
tional agencies to buy and store surplus products under the incentives 
of CAP.34 Through this system, EU farmers were guaranteed a minimum 
selling price for their agricultural products, no matter the disparities 
between the EU and international markets.35 
CAP also established an entry price in order to protect prices within 
the Union.36 The entry-price system sought to establish a minimum price 
at which agricultural products could be imported into the Union.37 It was 
designed to prevent goods from coming into the market at a lower price, 
thereby undermining EU products. Agricultural exports from the Union 
also enjoy an export subsidy: the ‘refund’. EU producers are paid a certa-
in amount for their exports in order to close the gap between lower world 
prices and the higher prices within the Union.38 Amongst the products 
protected by the intervention mechanisms, sugar became a priority.
Initially developed as a price management system, CAP sought to 
maintain and favour internal EU prices against world market prices. This 
32 European Parliament, ‘Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy’ (2010) 1 <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU_4.2.2.pdf> accessed 23 June 2011.
33 O Odek, ‘Impact of EU-CAP Reforms in East Africa’ (Friedrich Elbert Stiftung, 2003) 
4 <http://www.fes.de/cotonou/downloads/fesdownloads/.../IMPACTOF.EU-.PDF> acce-
ssed 2 May 2011.
34 Odek (n 33) 4.
35 Odek (n 33) 4.
36 Odek (n 33) 4.
37 Odek (n 33) 4.
38 Odek (n 33) 4.
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system is therefore one of commodity preference, assigning priority to 
local products rather than imports.39 
Through CAP 2013, the Union has carried out a radical shift from 
production support to producer support, thereby making CAP and EU 
farmers more market-orientated.40
At the heart of the producer-support system is the single payment 
scheme of direct aid payments to EU farmers, with price support mechani-
sms having been gradually transformed into decoupled direct payments. 
The single payment schemes are supported by numerous rural deve-
lopment measures designed to enhance the competitiveness of EU food 
and agricultural production and promote the economic diversification of 
rural areas. Over and above the producer-support system, the EU also 
implements, to varying degrees, traditional trade policy tools, such as 
MFN import tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), seasonal TRQs, minimum 
import prices, and import and export licenses.41 
The EU applies its internal policy rules of direct aid payments to far-
mers; investment support tools; new policy instruments; national support 
to agriculture; transitional measures and emergency programmes; and 
lastly, traditional agricultural trade policy tools in order to maintain its 
competitive advantage on the market.42 The above measures provide the 
EU with a competitive edge, allowing it to maintain its key role and tra-
ding position on the international market. These direct aid and funding 
tools enable it to protect its internal market while establishing future 
developments that put it ahead of the game.
The main problem, however, is how these protectionist tools of its in-
ternal market affect relations with its external trading partners. The over-
all effect of CAP on developing countries varies. The overall cost of CAP 
to the global economy through resource misallocations and missed trade 
opportunities is USD 75 billion.43 The next section will examine trade re-
lations between the EU and South Africa, and how the EU’s protectionist 
measures are damaging the trade opportunities and development of the 
southern hemisphere.
39 Odek (n 33) 5.
40 European Parliament: Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, ‘Draft Report 
on the Future of the Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’ (2010) 6 <http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/.../810067en.pdf> accessed 12 May 2011.
41 European Parliament (n 40) 3.
42 European Parliament (n 40) 4.
43 M Leen, ‘Integrating the International Development Goals into Europe’s Trade Policy 
and Practice: The Challenges of CAP Reform’ (Trócaire, 2002) <http://www.trocaire.org/
resources/tdr-article/integrating-international-development-goals-europes-trade-policy-
and-practice> accessed 6 May 2011.
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4. South Africa-EU trade relations
In 2009, South Africa was ranked as the European Union’s 14th lar-
gest global trading partner, and the 2nd largest from Africa.44 Currently, 
the European Union is South Africa’s largest single export market. South 
Africa, a country rich in natural resources, with a population of nearly 50 
million people, is regarded as the most financially and politically stable 
country in Africa. While comparatively a developed country, there are still 
large portions of the population that live in complete poverty. With the EU 
providing nearly 70% of all external assistance funds, it has become the 
most important developmental aid supplier and trading partner to South 
Africa.45 In turn, this makes the South African economy largely depen-
dent on the EU for its own internal market success.
4.1 South African trade
Over the last 17 years, South Africa has transformed itself from an 
import-substituting industrialisation regime to an export-orientated one. 
The result is a more open and market-orientated economy. Prior to po-
licy reform, tariff and non-tariff barriers dominated the country’s trade 
regime, thereby limiting any form of foreign competition. By gaining entry 
into the WTO, South Africa welcomed a completely new trading envi-
ronment. Entry into the WTO not only tested the quality of its products 
and its ability to service a market much bigger than its own, but also 
helped in establishing a certain level of competiveness that was required 
in order to succeed in such a demanding market.
Since 1994, and political transformation and entry into the WTO, 
the South African agricultural and trading sector has undergone many 
changes, increasingly integrating itself into world markets. After years of 
social and political exclusion, South Africa was determined to reintegrate 
into international markets. Economic integration and political cohesion 
therefore become a top priority for the South African government.
South Africa’s diverse range of agricultural and trading goods is a di-
rect result of its varied climatic regions. From extensive deserts to humid 
coastal regions, South Africa prides itself on the abundance of its varied 
natural resources. South Africa currently has a dual-based agricultural 
economy, where a developed commercial sector co-exists with a large 
number of subsistence (communal) farms.46 
South Africa’s agricultural activities range from intensive crop pro-
duction and mixed farming, to cattle ranching in the open wide plains, 
44 Gambini (n 4).
45 European Commission, ‘Bilateral Relations: South Africa’ (EUROPA, 2009) <http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/south-africa/> 
accessed 13 May 2011.
46 OECD (n 1).
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and sheep farming in the arid regions. Due to these varied resources, it 
is one of the world’s leading exporters of wine, sugar, fresh fruit, nuts, 
beverages, preserved food, tobacco, cereals, wool, meat, milling products, 
malt and starch. South Africa is also amongst the world’s top five expor-
ters of avocados, grapefruit, tangerines, plums, pears, table grapes and 
ostrich products. However, the majority of South African exports to the 
EU are fruit, coal, coca cola, and non-metallic manufactured mineral 
products from the region.
In 2006, a study compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) stated that nearly a third of South 
African produce was exported, making the South African agricultural and 
produce sector largely dependent on global markets.47 Increased agricul-
tural and produce exports, especially high-value agricultural commodi-
ties (fruit, vegetables, milk, meat, eggs, fish) and value-added products 
(raw materials that are then modified or enhanced) are considered pivotal 
in providing the growth impetus needed for the South African agricultu-
ral sector.48 In order for this to happen, the South African Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) aims to increase competiti-
veness, raise net exports and increase South Africa’s trade as a share of 
world trade. It hopes this will improve the overall trade composition and 
comparative advantage that South Africa has over its local competitors. 
The most important thing for South Africa is to raise its trade competi-
veness to the level of that of the EU. This, DAFF believes, will solidify its 
trading ability within the global market.
4.2 Government support
Due to the influx of trade and investment into the country over the 
last few years, the South African government has sought to establish me-
asures that protect its local producers. As the local agricultural markets 
are largely unsubsidised by the government, state officials have sought to 
create ways to protect local producers from external influences. 
In 1996, the government passed the Marketing of Agricultural Pro-
ducts Act.49 The Act, aimed at protecting South African farming from 
unfair international competition, sought to close agricultural marketing 
boards, phase out certain import and export controls, eliminate subsi-
dies, and introduce import tariffs.50 The South African government cla-
47 OECD (n 1).
48 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Economic Research Division, ‘Com-
petitiveness of Selected South African Agricultural Products in the European Union Mar-
ket’ (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Republic of South Africa, 2011) 2 
<http://www.daff.gov.za/docs/Economic_analysis/2011_ER.pdf> accessed 3 May 2011.
49 OECD (n 1).
50 OECD (n 1).
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ims that deregulation of the industry has allowed for a leaner, stronger 
agricultural industry, enabling local producers to align themselves with 
international competitors.
The current level of PSE (Producer Support Estimate) is 5%, rela-
tively low in comparison to markets of a similar nature.51 Market price 
support remains the largest component of producer support. However, 
the level of government support in the agricultural sector is remarka-
bly uneven across commodities, with sugar being the most supported 
commodity.
There has also been a significant decrease in budgetary payments 
in the sector, with the remaining budget support targeted towards rese-
arch, training, inspection and infrastructure development.52 A lack, or 
rather low level, of government support in the sector is largely due to 
inadequate supporting infrastructure. Public expenditure in the current 
structure and policy framework can be said to be a direct result of the 
historical trends and politics of the country rather than the needs of the 
sector. Despite this, the South African government has worked hard to 
re-establish its agriculture and trade sector, although it is constantly 
hindered by a lack of budgetary allowances for the industries. The total 
cost of support to the agricultural sector has fallen from 1% of GDP to a 
mere 0.59%.53 This is rather low, given that the average levels of support 
to countries such as those in the EU are 0.97%.54 
In order to increase global competiveness, South Africa recently 
adopted The South African Agricultural Production Strategy 2011-2015.55 
The strategy is aimed at improving agricultural support mechanisms to 
enable increased integration with world markets, in particular its main 
trading partner, the EU. However, despite economic gains from trade li-
beralisation, major economic and social challenges remain. In the light 
of the EU’s recent restructuring of its own agriculture and trade sector, 
South Africa has little chance of meeting the new challenges that these 
developments impose on its trade relations. South African farmers are 
already facing substantial financial pressure. Any more challenges in the 
market may leave them out in the cold. 
South Africa is not the only developing market vying for EU attenti-
on. Steady competition from Australia, Argentina, Chile and Brazil keeps 
51 OECD (n 1).
52 OECD (n 1).
53 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of the Republic of South Africa, ‘South 
African Agricultural Production Strategy 2011-2015’ (Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries of the Republic of South Africa, 2011) 10 <http://www.nda.agric.za/doaDev/
doc/IGDP/AGRIC_PRODUCTION_STRATEGY_FRAMWK.pdf> accessed 5 May 2011.
54 DAFF (n 53).
55 DAFF (n 53).
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the South African market on its toes and its attention constantly on de-
velopments within the EU. The necessity of alliance with the EU not only 
enhances market possibilities for South Africa, but also assists in deve-
loping global market opportunities.
4.3 Benefits of an open market for South Africa
Through international trade agreements, the South African economy 
has been transformed into a society that is filled with economic potenti-
al, and which is a playground for foreign investment. Its success is ma-
inly based on the development of its internal market, allowing external 
players to change the level of the game.56 South Africa’s counter-seaso-
nality to Europe is a major competitive advantage. South Africa is the 
closest major southern hemisphere producer of agricultural and floricul-
tural products to Europe, and has significantly shorter shipping times 
than those of its southern hemisphere trade rivals. 
Whilst an integral member of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group of countries, South Africa was not privy to the preferenti-
al trade agreements afforded to other ACP members under the Cotonou 
agreement of 2000, as it was regarded as a relatively developed nation, 
and was therefore found not to be eligible for many of the privileges affor-
ded to other ACP states under the agreement. Although a signatory, it 
benefits from limited membership.
As South Africa is the continent’s biggest economy, and is not con-
sidered as a least developed country, it fails to benefit from EU regula-
tions that apply to other African states.
South Africa’s trade relations and developmental policies towards the 
EU are therefore governed by a separate union, the Trade, Development 
and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). The TDCA was ratified on 1 October 
1999 in Pretoria, South Africa. However, it only fully entered into force in 
May 2004.57 The agreement aims to establish a free trade area over a 12-
year period between the two trading partners, covering 90% of bilateral 
trade. The agreement deals mostly with the free movement of goods and 
services, but also provisions that include investment strategies. 
Since the inception of the TDCA, South Africa has seen a rise in its 
EU exports from EUR 15.8 billion in 2004 to nearly EUR 22.2 billion in 
2008. Trade volume has risen almost a third from EUR 31.8 billion in 
56 OECD, ‘Domestic Reforms Help South Africa Benefit From Freer Agriculture Trade’ 
(OECD, 2006) <http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,2340,
en_2649_201185_36482904_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed 12 May 2011.
57 Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) [1999] OJ L 311 <http://eu-
ropa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/south_africa/r12201_en.htm> accessed 11 
May 2011.
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2004.58 The agreement outlines several objectives: strengthening dialo-
gue between the EU and South Africa; supporting South Africa in its eco-
nomic and social transition process; promoting regional co-operation and 
economic integration in southern Africa; and expanding and liberalising 
trade in goods, services, and capital.59 The agreement is considered to 
have played an important role in integrating South Africa (a once mainly 
export-based country) into the global economy.
4.4 Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA)
The TDCA, in line with WTO trade rules, commits both the EU and 
South Africa to reducing tariffs based on the applied rates at the time of 
entering into the agreement. Under the agreement, trade goods are di-
vided into agricultural and industrial products.60 The EU’s interests are 
said to lie in development within the agricultural sector and the opening 
of its markets, whilst the South African government is more focused on 
the tariff eliminations that will be seen in the industrialised sector. The 
agreement is configured in such a way that reform of agricultural mar-
kets will take priority in the first half of the 12-year implementation peri-
od, with the elimination of tariffs in the industrial sector to be accessed in 
greater detail in the latter half of the timeframe. The observed asymmetry 
in the liberalisation of the sectors is to allow for different respective levels 
of development to take place in the interim.61 
Under the agreement, the EU is to eliminate 95% of its tariffs on cu-
rrently traded goods, whilst South Africa is to reduce its tariffs by 86%.62 
However, the changes in EU tariffs affect only 25% of its currently traded 
goods with South Africa, with the average EU tariff on these goods amo-
unting to 2.7%.63 The greater burden therefore seems to fall on South 
Africa, as tariff changes will affect 40% its currently traded goods with an 
average tariff of 10%.64
58 European Commission, ‘Bilateral Relations: South Africa’ (EUROPA, 2009) <http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/south-africa/> 
accessed 13 May 2011.
59 TDCA (n 57).
60 M Kalaba, R Sandrey and D Ernst van Seventer, ‘Analysis of Trade between South Africa 
and the EU and a Preliminary Attempt to Examine the Impact of the EU/SA FTA on Trade’ 
(Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, 2005) 6 <http://www.tips.org.za/.../SA_EU_FTA_
Mid-term_Review_Final_Report_0.pdf> accessed 2 May 2011.
61 Kalaba, Sandrey and Ernst van Seventer (n 60).
62 C Grant, ‘Southern Africa and the European Union: The TDCA and SADC EPA’ (Tra-
de Law Centre for Southern Africa, 2006) 3 <https://www.givengain.com/unique/tralac/
pdf/20060518_TDCA_SADC_EPA_Grant.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011.
63 Grant (n 62) 3.
64 Grant (n 62) 3.
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South Africa was further requested to liberalise its agricultural sec-
tor by eliminating 81% of tariffs on EU agricultural exports to South Afri-
ca within the set timeframe, with an additional agreement to eliminate 
at least 46% of tariffs within the first five years.65 In comparison, it was 
agreed to eliminate a mere 62% of tariffs on South African agricultural 
exports to the EU.66
However, South Africa has been careful to protect particular local 
products that are considered regionally sensitive. Not excluded from ta-
riff reduction, but rather under review, these products include meat and 
preserved meat products, sugar and high sugar-content products such 
as chewing gum and cereals. Arguably, the greater burden on tariff re-
ductions has therefore fallen on South Africa. Nevertheless, in 2004 the 
South African government claimed that trade between the European Uni-
on and South Africa had grown a staggering 50% since the inception of 
the agreement, thereby restating their positive stance towards the agree-
ment. However, South Africa seems to be the only southern African state 
that is fully content with the outcome of the TDCA.67
Due to trade diversion, the trade agreement between the EU and 
South Africa has resulted in a decrease in tariff revenue for neighbouring 
southern African states. Not only did the TDCA result in the eliminati-
on of previous trade agreements between the southern states, trade was 
swiftly diverted to the new trading partners. It was estimated that Bot-
swana lost nearly 10% of its total national income because of the TDCA 
partnership. Due to the rules of origin within the provisions of the TDCA 
agreement, neighbouring states of South Africa are excluded from prefe-
rential access to EU markets.68 
However, due to the recent economic climate, there has been a dra-
matic fall in South African trade with the EU. Between 2000 and 2008, 
EU-South Africa trade saw an incredible 61% increase from EUR 26.5 
billion in 2000 to 42.6 billion in 2008.69 During this period, exports grew 
by 71% and imports over 52%.70 In the space of one year, the economic 
crisis changed things dramatically. Between 2008 and 2009, EU exports 
to South Africa fell by 20%, with imports decreasing by a staggering 
33%.71 This significant fall in the market called for the EU to rethink and 
re-establish its trade mechanisms. It sought to restructure itself in such 
a way that it would protect its internal market from the grave collapse of 
the global market.
65 Grant (n 62) 3.
66 Grant (n 62) 3.
67 Grant (n 62) 3.
68 Grant (n 62) 4.
69 Gambini (n 4).
70 Gambini (n 4).
71 Gambini (n 4).
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5. Disparities in the market: the example of the sugar sector
The relationship between the European Union and South Africa is a 
classic example of a north-south relationship. South African exports are 
primarily natural resources and minerals, whilst its imports are mainly 
manufactured products from the EU. Due to the increase in dependency 
on European markets, South Africa has become market sensitive to the 
high levels of volatility in EU markets. As South Africa is the weaker 
player, it therefore absorbs more knocks in the financial market than the 
EU. Disruptions in its own internal markets are often caused by changes 
in the EU demand-and-supply chain of events.
However, the consequence of EU-South African trade agreements 
has often resulted in large disparities in the South African market. The 
sugar industry in South Africa has taken an incredible knock in trying to 
adjust to the EU standards required by the terms of the trade partnership 
between the two countries.
5.1 Global sugar industry
Sugar is among the most traded commodities, with exports accoun-
ting for nearly one quarter of global agricultural production. It is also one 
of the most distorted and contentious topics in the global trade arena.
Currently, the majority of sugar trade occurs through preferential 
trade agreements between two or more countries. Whilst these agree-
ments establish new trading opportunities, they often lead to the elimina-
tion of other more economically viable trading producers from the sector. 
The EU sugar sector is governed by the Common Market Organisa-
tion (CMO). Created in 1968, it was established with the aim of creating 
an internally protected market, free from external market influences.72 
With EU producers guaranteed a stable income, the CMO sought the 
establishment of a self-sustaining sugar empire within the Union.73 In or-
der to become a self-sustaining trading giant, the EU imposed significant 
measures to ensure its trading superiority on international markets. By 
encouraging the principal of community preference, domestically produ-
ced goods became favoured over imports.
From the moment the CMO was established, the EU sugar commu-
nity became fiercely protected from any external competition.74 Import 
levies were applied to all sugar-related products entering the Union, and 
72 European Commission, ‘Reforming the European Union’s Sugar Policy’ (EUROPA, 2003) 
8 <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/reports/sugar/fullrep_en.pdf> accessed 13 
June 2011.
73 European Commission (n 72).
74 European Commission (n 72).
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community production was largely influenced by community demand, 
with surplus stock dumped on the international market.75 For a long 
time, the EU sugar sector escaped internal reforms, and sugar reforms 
within the EU, or rather the lack thereof, went largely unnoticed.
For decades, the EU controlled the world sugar sector, claiming top 
world export status in the refined sugar market.76 According to Oxfam, 
with a production cost nearly double internationally competitive rates, it 
cost the EU nearly USD 600 to produce one ton of sugar, as opposed to 
USD 280 for competitive countries such as South Africa.77
Due to such high production costs, the only way that EU sugar pro-
ducers could benefit from sugar exports was through government support 
measures. EU sugar producers therefore became the most protected su-
gar competitors on the international market. In order to maintain its 
stronghold over international markets, the EU was therefore required 
to implement stringent and complex import controls, price support and 
export subsidies.
Dependent on the world market for the vast majority of its sugar 
exports, and with no quota allowance, the South African sugar industry 
lost EUR 39-75 million annually because of EU protectionism during this 
period.78
Through its government support measures, the EU was able to de-
press world prices, thereby discriminating against producers that were 
more efficient within the sector. By controlling the market, the EU was 
able to close the gap between its own high sugar prices and the conside-
rably lower world ones. As a result, consumers were left paying incredibly 
high prices for sugar, and developing countries left struggling to maintain 
their internal markets due to the misrepresentation in the market.
EU government subsidies resulted in the over-production of sugar 
in the internal sector, allowing the EU to dump excess stock on the world 
market, pushing other sugar exporters out of it.79 Dumped sugar was then 
sold at world market prices, with Brazil the only country able to produce 
sugar at the disputed prices.80 This left developing countries struggling to 
survive in the face of protectionism and highly subsidised exports.
75 European Commission (n 72).
76 Oxfam, ‘How the EU’s Sugar Sector is Devastating Livelihoods in the Developing World’ 
(Oxfam, 2002) 1 <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp27_su-
gar.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011.
77 Oxfam (n 76) 4.
78 Oxfam (n 76) 4.
79 R Gibb, ‘Developing Countries and Market Access: The Bitter-Sweet Taste of the Euro-
pean Union’s Sugar Policy in Southern Africa’ (2004) 42(4) The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 563, 581.
80  Oxfam (n 76).
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At the start of 2000, the EU was embroiled in a trade battle in the 
sugar industry. It was lambasted by the World Trade Organisation and 
developing countries for not lowering its protectionist stance towards its 
sugar industry.81 The EU was accused of distorting the global sugar mar-
ket due to the high levels of government support to the industry. EU 
government support to the industry was said to result in huge trade di-
stortions, with domestic consumers forced to pay high prices for sugar, 
whilst developing countries were left facing depressed world prices and 
reduced trade opportunities.
In 2002, the EU was summoned before the WTO, and following inter-
national pressure was forced to liberalise its immensely distorted sugar 
regime.82 Countries argued that the highly protected EU sector was leading 
to large disparities on world markets, with damaging effects on future pro-
duction. The reforms resulted in the elimination of intervention strategies 
and the introduction of a reference price in the sector. The EU agreed to a 
36% reduction in product price to be phased in over four years.83
Reductions in subsidies have resulted in less over-production and 
therefore higher world prices due to a more limited supply in the sugar 
sector. However, a higher price has allowed lower-cost producers to redu-
ce their own protectionist measures within the market.
Although these reforms did not completely readjust the markets 
towards a more liberal trading regime, they lowered the protectionist 
stance enough to allow the development of other markets to occur. After 
reducing its subsidies, the EU became the world’s largest sugar importer.
5.2 CAP’s response to the sugar sector
By the end of 2009, the sugar sector reforms agreed upon by the EU 
in 2005 had been fully implemented.84 The reform process resulted in the 
end of sugar production in five EU Member States, with further reduc-
tions of nationally allocated quotas in six Member States.85 Reductions 
were therefore consistent with the basic objectives of CAP reforms.
However, while production quotas were reduced, it did not automati-
cally result in a decrease in the volume of sugar harvested. In June 2009, 
German sugar production was reported to have been 28.6% above the 
post-reform quota, even exceeding the pre-reform quota level.86 However, 
81  Agritrade, ‘Sugar: Trade Issues for the ACP’ (Agritrade, 2010) <http://agritrade.cta.int/
en/Commodities/Sugar-sector/Executive-brief> accessed 10 May 2011.
82 Agritrade (n 81).
83 Agritrade (n 81).
84 Agritrade (n 81).
85 Agritrade (n 81).
86 Agritrade (n 81).
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the EU insisted that overflows in the market were redistributed towards 
the facilitation of other sectors, such as the biofuels industry.87 The EU 
continues to reassure global market competitors that its crop production 
will shrink with time as its harvesting methods are slowly eliminated and 
the efforts and resources used targeted towards other sustainable means 
of production. 
Therefore, in order to facilitate the global reform process, the EU 
has sought to re-establish its market management tools within the sec-
tor. Apart from the production quota system, the three basic tools that 
currently manage the EU sugar sector are export subsidies, the inward 
processing regime, and the management of tariff-rate quota-regulated 
imports.88 However, the EU plans to eliminate all export funds by 2013.89 
The EU believes that effective management of the sector will ensure the 
long-term objective of closing the gap between high EU sugar prices and 
lower world ones.
5.3 The South African sugar sector
The South African sugar industry is ranked eighth in the world,90 
with 50% of its production exported to global markets. Sugar plays a 
large role in the South African economy, accounting for a large portion of 
the employment sector. Due to this fact, the South African government is 
determined to establish trade agreements that will allow its local market 
to flourish in the globally distorted sugar sector.
Already facing the hard task of competing with the EU’s protection-
ist measures, South Africa faces another obstacle in its flourishing mar-
ket: water. With water demands predicted to outstrip available supply by 
2030,91 the South African government has assigned the utmost importance 
to maximising sugar production whilst it still has the means. The gov-
ernment has therefore sought to conclude an EPA (Economic Partnership 
Agreement) with the EU allowing it to export a certain quota of sugar to 
the EU market duty-free. This EPA, however, is a temporary measure until 
such time that the South African market is able to secure the full duty 
and quota-free access benefits that have been secured for other Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) members. Improved access to 
the EU sugar market will increase South African sugar sector revenues, re-
versing the decline that is currently being experienced in the local market. 
87 Agritrade (n 81).
88 Agritrade (n 81).
89 Agritrade (n 81).
90 Illovo Sugar, ‘International Sugar Statistics’ (Illovo Sugar, 2011) <http://www.illovosu-
gar.co.za/World_of_sugar/Sugar_Statistics/International.aspx> accessed 15 June 2011.
91 Brand South Africa, ‘South African Agriculture’ (SouthAfrica.info, 2008) <http://www.
southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/agricultural-sector.htm> accessed 14 June 
2011.
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The trade agreement, if approved, will establish South Africa as an equal 
player amongst other sugar-producing developing countries.
South Africa therefore relies on the liberalisation of markets in order 
to free itself from the continual trade distortions that seem to cloud the 
development of its sugar market. South Africa does not have the econo-
mic capacity or ability to be able to support its farmers in a way that will 
allow them to have a competitive advantage, protecting them from the 
continual disruptions within the sugar sector. It therefore relies upon 
further trade integration with the EU in order to facilitate its development 
in internal markets. The South African government hopes that initiating 
an EPA with the EU will assist in removing the disparity on the markets. 
It believes the future potential benefits of the agreement will lead to the 
protection of its internal market, opening up new trade and producti-
on opportunities that are currently unattainable. South Africa therefore 
continues to push for bilateral trade negotiations with the EU in order to 
secure the future prosperity of its markets.
The consequence of EU-South African trade agreements has clearly 
resulted in large disparities within the South African market. A prime 
example of this is the South African sugar sector. The industry has been 
hard hit by trying to adjust to the EU standards required by the terms 
of the trade partnership between the two countries. However, the South 
African government has raised concerns. It fears that whilst opening up 
its agricultural markets to the EU may benefit certain sectors, it may also 
be to the detriment of others.
6. Future impact of the EU’s internal market 
With nearly 96% of the world’s farmers living in developing countries,92 
supplying nearly 2.5 billion people with an adequate food supply,93 there is 
an overwhelming need to apply appropriate agricultural and development 
strategies to ensure optimal use of current available supplies. The EU is 
constantly seeking ways in which to enter these markets using its key 
player status. Its continual brokering of trade deals with developing econo-
mies has allowed it to gain access to untapped markets, thereby obtaining 
top resources at low costs for its own internal market. Through its own 
internal protectionist measures, it has sheltered its own economy, whilst 
developing those of others. In 2001, closed EU markets were said to have 
cost developing countries over USD 100 billion in lost opportunities.94
92 W Minter, ‘Africa and the World Trade Organization: The Issues in Brief’ (Foreign Policy 
in Focus, 2001) <http://www.fpif.org/articles/africa_and_the_world_trade_organization_
the_issues_in_brief> accessed 12 May 2011.
93 Minter (n 92).
94 Minter (n 92).
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In a study conducted by the World Bank, full trade liberalisation by 
developing countries is said to bring approximately USD 200 to 500 billi-
on in additional income to them.95 This is made particularly clear in the 
agriculture sector, where agricultural subsidies to farmers in the EU are 
more than six times the amount that is afforded to developing countries 
for developmental assistance.96 
Developing countries rely heavily on export earnings from their agri-
cultural sector, with some countries’ agricultural incomes contributing 
nearly 40% towards their annual income.97 They are therefore reliant on 
trade negotiations with the EU in order to gain access to world markets. 
South Africa, a perfect example of a developing state (not yet considered a 
developed country, but hardly bundled into the harness of poverty-stric-
ken countries that the rest of Africa is), uses its developing nation status 
to acquire trade deals with the EU. These trade agreements afford South 
Africa great potential and future gains for its economy, even if it is at the 
expense of its neighbours or, to some extent, its own expense.
Even though the EU might have lowered its internal protectionist 
measures due to international pressure, it reaffirms these market restric-
tions in its trade agreements with developing countries. In turn, these EU 
market restrictions further undermine the internal development of the 
developing country. The EU clearly stated in its 2002 CAP reforms that 
whilst the reform process will improve market opportunities for develo-
ping countries, it is not the overall objective: enhancement of EU agricul-
ture is.98 A central element in CAP reform has been the shift from price 
support to farmers to direct income support. Whilst government support 
for lower production levels is allowed, government support for increased 
production levels is not. Ironically, the latter is exactly what is needed in 
order to tackle the issue of food security in developing countries. Howe-
ver, the EU argues that in shifting aid to direct payments to farmers, it 
allows the prices of EU-produced agricultural commodities to fall without 
undermining farm incomes and production within the EU.99 However, 
developing countries do not have the means to protect or to subsidise 
local producers. This makes trading on an equal basis impossible, as 
the levels of development and competitiveness of the trading partners is 
vastly different.
95 D van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Estimating the Benefits of Trade Reform: Why Numbers Chan-
ge’ in R Newfarmer (ed), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues (World 
Bank 2005) 1.
96 Minter (n 92).
97 Minter (n 92).
98 Minter (n 92).
99 P Goodison, ‘What is the Future for EU-Africa Agricultural Trade after CAP Reform?’ 
(2007) 34 (112) Review of African Political Economy 279, 289.
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The reforms of EU agricultural policy therefore seem to be a double-
edged sword. Whilst on the one hand they are seen to lower protectionist 
measures, on the other they increase levels of government support in 
other sectors, thereby decreasing the chances of developing farmers re-
aching optimal levels of supply and demand on international markets. It 
is therefore clear that any form of market support will result in a distor-
tion of levels of trade in developing countries.
6.1 Impact on South Africa
Currently South Africa enjoys the trading privileges afforded to it 
by the TDCA agreement. However, this has resulted in a trade diversion 
from its previous trading arrangements with its neighbours. South Africa 
has been required to open its markets to the EU, eliminating importation 
costs in exchange for improved access to EU markets.
Since the inception of the trade deal with the EU, South Africa has 
also enjoyed an increase in political dialogue with the EU. This has re-
sulted in its inclusion in discussions where the effects of future interna-
tional trade deals and the consequences of global climatic concerns are a 
priority. The trade deal afforded South Africa not only economic benefits, 
but also an invitation to join the exclusive club of the world’s most power-
ful nations. It feels the benefits of inclusion outweigh the costs.
The main issue, which seems to be a recurring problem in trade re-
lations with the EU, is that South Africa is required to open its market, 
allowing full EU access, whilst the EU fails to open its own internal mar-
kets to the same extent.
A further concern for the South African sugar sector is the control 
that EU-based companies will have in South African markets. In a recent 
development, Associated British Foods (ABF) bought a majority share in 
Illovo Sugar (an African-based production company).100 Entry into the 
African market by ABF secured 40% of South African sugar producti-
on, doubling the total level of sugar production ABF controlled globally. 
South Africa and its neighbours fear the impact that this EU powerhouse 
will have on its markets.101 Local producers and government officials alike 
worry whether ABF will exploit local markets in order to serve European 
or international markets, exploiting South Africa as a low-cost supplier of 
raw sugar. This has resulted in huge concerns within the African market 
regarding the effects of trade liberalisation in the region. 
In the case of South Africa, liberalising local markets and thereby 
allowing duty-free access to certain products (such as sweets and cho-
100 Goodison (n 99) 284.
101 Goodison (n 99) 284.
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colate), whilst at the same time trying to protect its basic agriculture 
(eg sugar), has resulted in undermining the competitive position of local 
companies on national and regional markets.102 This however, appears to 
be a double-edged sword. In order for South Africa to compete and enter 
international markets, it needs to open up its markets to EU investment.
7. Conclusion
South Africa’s entry into the European market has afforded it new 
trade advantages and infinite investment opportunities. However, it has 
also been to the detriment of its neighbours, whereby the exclusion of 
previous trading partners has often led to a loss in national integration. 
The South African-EU partnership has therefore come at a price. Howe-
ver, this heavy price is yet to be seen. Whether or not the South African 
government is able to stand its ground against this major trade super-
power will establish future trade relations.
If the EU were to eliminate all of its tariff barriers when trading with 
South Africa, European farmers would still be at an advantage. Despite 
EU farming methods being expensive and South Africa having a com-
petitive advantage with the goods that they are able to produce, the EU 
enhances its agricultural sector through various support structures and 
large subsidies that the South African government is unable to compete 
with.
This paper has sought to examine the development of two distinct 
trading partners. Whilst huge disparities still exist, both the EU and 
South Africa have used the TDCA to benefit their internal markets thro-
ugh improved market access.
102 Goodison (n 99) 284.
